


Sociological Papers

WOMEN IN ISRAELI JUDAISM

Series Editor: Larissa Remennick

Managing Editor: Ana Prashizky



Volume 14, 2009

**Sponsored by the Leon Tamman Foundation for
Research into Jewish Communities**



**SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTE FOR COMMUNITY STUDIES
BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY**

The Learners' Society: Education and Employment among Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Women

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Abstract

The author reports her data on the patterns and associations between some key socio-demographic variables (age, education, employment, numbers of children, and exposure to Haredi and secular media) in a sample of 300 women of Hassidic and Lithuanian (*Litaim*) communities in Jerusalem. This sample demonstrates relatively high rates of post-secondary education and gainful employment among Haredi women, characteristics that are associated with lower fertility rates and higher consumption of secular Israeli media. Women of the Lithuanian community are more often foreign-born, have a more liberal background, are better educated and show more diverse patterns of employment, often in skilled occupations. Hassidic women typically have fewer years of formal study, lower rates of employment, and less common use of secular media. In both communities, working women with higher education have fewer children. The author concludes that Haredi women are gradually narrowing the gap with mainstream Israeli society as a result of their participation in the labor market, exposure to secular mass media and public sphere in general.

Introduction

This article sheds light on the patterns of participation of Israeli Haredi women in the world of education, vocational training and subsequent gainful employment in relation to their socio-demographic and personal characteristics, such as country of origin, number of children, affiliation with a specific ultra-Orthodox community (Hassidic and Lithuanian), and the consumption of secular Israeli media. The survey was conducted in a sample of 300 Haredi women living in Jerusalem – the city with the largest and most diverse ultra-Orthodox population in the country. The findings add some important facets to the growing body of research on this segment of Israeli society known for its isolated lifestyle and limited contact with the mainstream. Although some new studies among Haredi communities in general and specifically among the women have been published in recent years (e.g., Caplan, 2007; Shenker, 2006), most were ethnographic or qualitative and therefore did not provide any macro-level data. Little is known about the many changes that have taken place in the patterns of study and work among Haredi women since the early years of the State of Israel and how these changes have affected their family lives, fertility, and participation in the larger society. While contemporary Haredi

Jews are of multiple ethnic origins, this research focused only on the two major ultra Orthodox Ashkenazi groups – Hassidic and Lithuanian (Litaim, also known as Mitnagdim).

Theoretical background

The ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) community

Ultra-Orthodox Jews lead their private and public lives in strict compliance with the dictates of the Jewish law and tradition. According to existing estimates, the Haredi population comprises 6.7% of the adult (aged 20+) Jewish population of Israel (ICBS,¹ 2007). This sector is different from other religious Jewish communities, particularly in terms of its commitment to the prolonged study of Torah, which is considered a higher calling (*vis-à-vis* secular education and “profane work”) and an esteemed career for a man. Despite the popular stereotypes of men in black outfits and women in old-fashioned long dresses, Haredi society is not monolithic but rather diverse, consisting of many separate movements and groups (*hatzerot, hugim and kehelot*) that follow different religious leaders who originated in Eastern Europe over the last two hundred years (Heilman and Friedman, 1991; Friedman, 1993; Liebman, 1992).

As a minority in Jewish Israel, Haredi communities have complex and often tense relations with state institutions and non-religious Israelis (Efron, 2003). They are very protective of their traditional way of life and intent on distancing themselves from modernity and its technological achievements, which Haredim view as moral threats (Ayalon et. al., 1989; Lee and Tse, 1994; Orbe, 1998). Withdrawal from contact with the Jewish majority turns ultra-Orthodox populations into “enclave cultures” (Sivan, 1991), in line with the description by Berry (1990) of separatist minorities that avoid “contaminating” influences from mainstream society. In this sense, Haredi Jews resemble other religious minorities and sects, such as the Amish and Mennonites in the U.S., who are intent on maintaining clear differences in their appearance and lifestyle to stress their distance from mainstream American society (Kraybill, 1998; Yoder, 1993; Driedger, 2000; Hostetler, 1993).

Haredi communities employ several defense strategies to cope with the challenge of exposure to the dominant secular culture. One such strategy is residential segregation – living in closed quarters populated only by “insiders,” thereby building a physical and social barrier to communication with the outside world. Another strategy is the representation of the secular world in the Haredi discourse (sectarian press, educational texts, rabbinical court decisions, and recently also Haredi Internet sites) as hostile, corrupt and a moral hazard (Bataille, 1992). Haredi authorities create multiple moral and material incentives for committed individuals, calling on them not to stray from the path of virtue and never look outside for answers to their personal problems (Sivan, 1991; Goldscheider and Uhlenberg, 1969). This closed society has developed multiple enforcement mechanisms and sanctions against any deviant conduct. In a way, Haredi society has achieved the ideal of Durkheim’s (1893/1969) “mechanical solidarity,” i.e. adherence to collective goals and values of the group at the expense of individual freedom and self-development. Such groups typically maintain a high level of social control via persistent socialization of the young and strong dependency of individuals on the group’s norms and leaders for fulfilling their personal needs (Hechter, 1983, 1987).

¹ Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.

Haredi women in the private and public sphere

Social researchers have been increasingly interested in Haredi women. Initial studies were published during the 1980s (e.g., Goshen-Gottstein, 1984), but particular advances in the anthropological study of Haredi women are linked to the work of El-Or (1993, 1994, 1995, 1997). Over the last decade, research among Haredi women has expanded to include additional psychological and social aspects of their lifestyle (for example, Zalcborg, 2005).

Haredi women comprise 6.4% of all adult Israeli Jewish women (ICBS, 2007) and therefore they experience a double jeopardy – as women and as members of the ultra-Orthodox community, with its discriminatory norms and practices. The essence of this derogatory attitude towards woman often cited in Haredi literature is expressed in the Hebrew saying “*Kol Kvoda Bat Melekh Pnima*” (Psalms 45:14), meaning that “king’s daughter’s beauty is internal” and/or “king’s daughter should turn her honor inwards” – be quiet, keep a low profile, occupy as little space as possible. The subject of modesty and submissiveness as woman’s key virtue is discussed endlessly in girls’ school classes, popular literature for women, and Haredi media. As a traditional society guarding its cultural boundaries and wishing for its continuity in future generations (Barzilai, 2003; Caplan, 2007), Haredi communities reaffirm man’s place in the center of the public domain, with woman’s place in the periphery, and primarily in the private sphere (El Or, 1993, 1995, 1997; Friedman, 1988, 1991).

To secure this gender system, girls and young women are socialized into their future role as mothers, wives and homemakers, responsible for the smooth functioning of the household, while men are encouraged to pursue their advanced Torah studies, politics, and other masculine goals (Friedman, 1988). Haredi families typically have high numbers of children, reflecting the imperative moral value of fertility (in fulfillment of the Torah precept to “be fruitful and multiply” Genesis 1:28) and women’s place in the domestic sphere.² The average is 7.7 per woman vs. 2.6 among Jewish women in general (Gurovich and Cohen-Kastro, 2004). This level of fertility exerts a heavy physical burden, a tremendous workload and psychological responsibility on the women and older girls in Haredi families.

Yet, despite this ideological principle, Haredi women increasingly participate in the public sphere: they study, work outside the home, and contribute to their family’s income (Ben-Porath and Gronau, 1985; Garr and Marans, 2001). Since women’s presence in the public domain ostensibly deviates from the gender ideology of ultra-Orthodoxy, information and commentaries on this topic from Haredi sources are few and far between. The following is a brief summary on Haredi women’s external employment based on various historical and scholarly sources.

Over the years since the establishment of the state in 1948, Israeli society witnessed a gradual transition of Haredi men from the domain of gainful employment, to *hevrat lomdim* (learners society) engaged in the advanced Judaic studies in Yeshivas from youth till their 30s and 40s (Friedman, 1991; 1993). Under the leadership of Rabbi Karelitz (also known as Hazon Ish), the intense study of Gemara (*Talmud*) became the chief moral goal and career track for most Haredi men, for decades delaying them from engaging in vocational training and gainful employment (Heilman and Friedman, 1991). Besides the ideology of achieving excellence in Torah study, several historical, political and

² One example is the Haredi town Beitar Illit, where children under age 15 constitute 63% of the population.

economic circumstances in the early years of the state caused the exemption of Yeshiva students from military service on the grounds that *toratam omanutam* (Torah scholarship is their calling)³. Since these young Haredi men had no occupations and were exempt from army service, they were in fact “recruited” to their Yeshivas for many years of study.

This life track for the men had direct implications for the women. In 1952, Rabbi Karelitz and his close associate Rav Wolf opened the first high school and teacher training seminary in Bnei Brak for Haredi girls. The ideology behind this project was based on the *Talmudic* agreement between the ancient Israelite tribes of Issachar and Zebulun, whereby the woman earned a livelihood while the man devoted himself to learning Torah. Thus, women were simultaneously given a chance for education and called upon to become chief supporters of men in their career of higher learning. Women were expected to learn marketable skills and earn a living wage for their families while their husbands were immersed in theological debates in their Yeshivas. The women’s chief aspiration was to become wives of *talmidei chahamim* (outstanding Torah scholars) and good mothers to their children, at the expense of great personal sacrifice and a double burden of working and maintaining a household full of children (Friedman, 1988). Thus, from the late 1950s on, many Haredi women entered the job market, often in the sphere of childcare and education – occupations they learned in religious teacher training seminaries (Dahan, 1996; Berman and Klinov, 1997).⁴ Work in education has multiple advantages for Haredi women: it has flexible hours, opportunity for part-time work, and long summer vacations coinciding with their own children’s school vacation. In terms of social control, the employment in Haredi kindergartens and schools keeps the women within the community, under close moral supervision of administration, parents and co-workers (Friedman, 1988).

According to Schwartz (2008), in recent years Haredi women’s employment has gone beyond the domains of childcare and education. The need to seek other forms of employment reflects the limited number of openings in the Haredi school system, which are far below the numbers of graduates seeking jobs. Other job opportunities for these young women come from their acquisition of financial knowledge from technological education courses offered at the seminaries. These courses became possible following the government’s recognition of the need to include Haredi women in the mainstream labor market, and the sponsorship of many special training programs by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and various NGOs that support Jewish education. Often these programs are based on the apprenticeship of young Haredi women in various workplaces run by Haredi staff members in compliance with the requirements of the Haredi life style and daily conduct. From 2006, Haredi sector employment centers have been operating in many Israeli cities, and 71% of those applying for the jobs via these centers are young women with post-secondary education.

The employment of Haredi women is causing many new issues and disturbances in the ultra-Orthodox circles, as a growing number of young women who graduate from teachers’ seminaries seek employment in the general job market, specifically in high-tech

3 The historic agreement between the State and Haredi leaders stipulated that Yeshiva students exempt from army service could not be gainfully employed up to age 41. After that age (or alternatively having six or more children) they were no longer recruited into the army and could be gainfully employed.

4 In 2005, 55% of Haredi women of working age were employed outside of the home, compared to 44% of Haredi men. The reverse proportion is typical for secular Israelis: 83% of the women and 95% of the men work outside of the home (ICBS, 2006).

and computer-related industries, secretarial work, etc., which are beyond the sphere of traditional Haredi social control. Many religious authorities fear these women may find too much interest and independence in their work and may wish to develop a career, at the expense of their traditional family roles. Therefore, the Haredi mass media often reminds their readers that women's work is only the means to the end of their husbands' excellence in Torah study, and not a goal in and by itself (Neria-Ben Shahar, 2008).

Within the growing body of literature on the ultra-Orthodox sector, no study has examined the quantitative patterns of education and employment among Haredi women, their determinants and effects on family life and ties with the mainstream Israeli society, including consumption of secular media. Hence, the main questions we posed in this research were about: 1) the kinds of education and training Haredi women receive and their socio-demographic correlates; 2) percentages of women working outside of the home and their occupations; 3) the determinants and correlates of secular media consumption among these women; 4) inter-group differences between Hassidic and Lithuanian women and between those born in Israel and abroad; and 5) the associations between women's education, employment and the number of children they have. Since this is the first study of its kind, it is mainly descriptive, seeking to establish patterns rather than test specific hypotheses. It was conducted as part of the author's doctoral dissertation that centered on Haredi women's consumption of different kinds of Israeli mass media and its impact on the women's lives.

Methodology and participants

This kind of study is a cross-sectional investigation, measuring certain parameters and seeking to identify the ties between them at a specific moment in time and among the participants who were available and agreed to provide information. Given the lack of full lists of Haredi residents of Jerusalem (or even their total numbers), probability sampling was impossible in this study. The best we could do was to recruit the most heterogeneous female population possible, within our eligibility criteria (mainstream Haredi Ashkenazi groups only). The survey was conducted in 2005 among the women who were approached in several grocery stores catering to the Haredi population in different target neighborhoods of Jerusalem and on different days of the week at various times. The women were asked to fill in the questionnaire after a few screening questions to establish their eligibility. The questionnaire was composed specifically for this study and was pre-tested among ten Haredi women, with subsequent corrections and adjustments in light of their comments.

Altogether, 300 women completed the questionnaires. Of these women, 94% were married and 67% had husbands learning in advanced Yeshivas. About 30% of the husbands were employed or self-employed, in a variety of occupations, including 10.5 % in highly skilled professions. The mean age of the women in the sample was 35.3 (+/- 9.6) and most of them (89%) were aged between 20 and 49 years. About 93% had several children, with their mean number being close to 6, with standard deviation of 3.1; 19% of the sample had 9 children or more; 32% had 1-4 children. On average, their youngest child was 4.2 years old and the oldest one was 15.2 years old. Of all the respondents, 52% worked outside of the home, with 39% in occupations that require some post-secondary education (teaching, technical, laboratory, etc.), while 10% worked in secretarial, sales and service jobs. An additional 34% of the sample said they worked from home, most often in technical jobs (12.5%) and services, typically child care (11%).

These characteristics of the sample were generally similar to those found in the recent national survey among the Haredi population (ICBS, 2007).

Findings

Education levels

The level of education was measured by both the years of formal study and by academic degree. Since the rabbinical establishment prohibits obtaining secular education at the regular universities and colleges, almost all Haredi women study in women-only classes in the Haredi system of colleges that award graduates an “equivalent to academic degree” (B.Ed.). This degree is recognized by the Ministry of Education for the purposes of teachers’ compensation, so in this study it was considered an equivalent to Bachelor’s degree.

The mean number of years of education was 14.3 +/- 2.1; 32% of the women had under 13 years of schooling, 29% had 14 years and 39% had 15 years or more. Female students in the mainstream Haredi educational institutions for girls (Beit Ya'akov) typically study for 14 years (elementary, secondary and advanced-seminary). Thus over a third of the respondents studied beyond the standard requirements of Haredi schools. Most of these women continued their education in special courses or continuing education classes within the Haredi sector. A very small number of the women studied at Israeli or foreign universities.

Post-secondary education has multiple social implications for women, including higher levels of employment and income on the one hand, and lower fertility levels, on the other (Friedlander, 2002). While many women who participated in the pre-test and several in-depth interviews before the survey insisted that there should not be any link between women’s education and number of children, a significant negative association between these variables was found in the sample. Women with 15+ years of formal education had an average of 4.81 children, those with 14 years of school, 6.12 children and those with 13 years or less – 7.21 children (see Table 1 and Figure 1 in the end of this paper). These differences, as well as similar disparities between women who are homemakers and those gainfully employed, demonstrate that Haredi women are influenced by the trends of the mainstream Israeli society and have to balance their family and work roles. The inevitable by-product of women’s education and employment is lower childbearing rates.

Women with higher education (including BA/B.Ed. equivalent degrees) comprised 26% of the sample, which is on par with all Israeli Jewish women under the age of 50 (about 28-30%). Similar numbers studied in Haredi programs and in regular universities, usually abroad (in the US and Europe). All these women mentioned that obtaining higher education entailed high financial and personal costs for them (including later age at marriage and birth of the 1st child), and was often frowned upon by their families and rabbis. Table 2 shows that the women holding academic degrees have fewer children and are more exposed to the mainstream media (secular radio stations) than are women without academic degrees. There was no difference in the mean ages of women with and without academic degrees, so the more educated women’s smaller families reflect social choices and not biological factors (higher cumulative fertility with rising woman’s age).

Employment

In the study sample, 52% of the women worked outside of the home, mostly in child care and education, and another 43% worked as caregivers or teachers/tutors in their own homes. This level of gainful employment in the sample (95%) contradicts the employment rate of 55% among Haredi women reported by ICBS (2004). This gap can probably be explained by the fact that home-based income is typically not reported to tax authorities and remains within the small-scale cash economy (in most cases this income does not even reach taxable levels).

Women who work outside the home can be described as "modernized:" they are better educated, have fewer children, and have higher exposure to secular media (radio). The t-tests that describe the differences in the profile of the employed versus the unemployed respondents are shown in Table 3. These indicators of a relatively modern lifestyle are interrelated: higher academic achievements widen employment opportunities, and work outside the home compels women to limit their fertility by means of birth control. In most demographic studies, family size among working women is smaller than among homemakers (Drobnic, Blossfeld and Rohwer, 1999; Okun, 2004).

At the same time, Haredi women who spend more time outside the home (on buses, in workplaces) have higher chances of listening to mainstream radio stations that are "off limits" in their households. (Israeli bus drivers often play the radio on their loudspeakers.) This opens the window to the external world, current events, and opinions that are beyond their own strictly defined world.

Intergroup differences

Social differences between the two groups are known from the existing literature (Friedman, 1991). In this study, Lithuanian women comprised 63.5% of the sample and Hassidic women 36.6%. The summary of their characteristics is shown in Table 4: Lithuanian women are more educated and more often exposed to modern media. Although the difference in the years of education is only 1.5 years, this means that Lithuanian women have studied at least for the regular 14 years of Haredi girls' schooling and often beyond this, while many Hassidic women did not even graduate from seminary (most probably due to early marriage). Thus, this modest difference in the years of education could indicate major differences in employment and family formation. At the same time, we found no significant differences in the rates of employment and numbers of children between the two groups of Haredi women.

Differences between Israeli and foreign-born women have also been examined. Most of the women (73%) were born in Israel, but among the women's fathers, only 44% were born in Israel. No significant differences have been found between the main demographic variables in the two groups. Since women who grew up abroad were usually socialized in a more liberal milieu compared to Israeli Haredi culture (which discourages women's higher education), we have also tested and confirmed the hypothesis that women who immigrated to Israel as young adults more often had academic degrees than did Israeli-born women (50% vs. 23%, chi-square test significant at $P < .01$). Yet, despite this advantage, foreign-born women did not have higher employment rates or fewer children – which may reflect their process of "Israelization" upon immersion in the local Haredi communities.

Exposure to the mainstream secular media

The religious authorities of the Haredi community strongly discourage the exposure of their members (adults and minors alike) to the press, radio and TV (as well as literature) produced by the “corrupt” secular society. The Haredi public is constantly warned against “letting the dirt from the street enter your clean homes,” namely letting in the news and comments surrounding politics, crime, violence, sex, and other impure subjects that abound in secular media. Haredi journalists undergo special training on how to select and censor the news and other coverage, and are constantly supervised by rabbinical bodies. Since consumption of secular media is strongly condemned (and hence a direct question in this regard would most likely be answered negatively), we had to find more subtle ways to discover whether Haredi women are exposed to it. The wording of the question was: “Do you sometimes listen to non-Haredi radio stations, read non-Haredi press or watch TV?” (The question was posed after asking similar questions about the Haredi media). If a woman answered yes in at least one of these categories, she was classified as a “consumer of secular media” (a dummy variable composed of the three).

About 32% of the sample (N=91) answered that they consume secular media with varying frequencies. These women typically belonged to the modernized group: they were more educated, worked more, and had somewhat fewer children. The differences in the demographic profiles of the women who do and do not consume secular media are summarized in Table 5. Women who consume secular media, and hence have a better idea about how other (secular) Israeli women and families live, have on average one child fewer than the women who chose not to be exposed to secular life styles. This association can of course be accidental (this type of the study does not allow making causal inferences), but it is nevertheless very indicative of the potential role of the media exposure in the women’s “modernization.”

Next, we tested the associations between employment and exposure to secular media. Women who worked outside their homes were exposed to secular mass media almost twice as often as homemakers (41% vs. 21%). Specifically, these frequencies for radio were 36% vs. 17% and for secular press 17% vs. 8% (all three chi-square tests significant at $p < .01$). Some women noted on the margins of the questionnaires that their exposure to the secular media was involuntary, e.g. while riding on the bus on the way to work, but in many cases this was an intended behavior (one cannot read a newspaper involuntarily). Women from the Lithuanian community were more often exposed to secular media than were Hassidic women (36% vs. 23% in general; 33% vs. 20% respectively regarding secular radio; chi-square tests significant at $p < .05$). This finding may be explained by the higher proportion of Lithuanian women with an academic degree (38% vs. 18% among Hassidic women), as well as the higher proportion of Lithuanian women born and educated abroad (34% vs. 15%, both significant at $p < .01$) or whose fathers had been born and educated abroad (65% and 42%, respectively).

Discussion and conclusion

This research reflects an attempt to assess quantitatively the relationships between different socio-demographic characteristics of Haredi Israeli women. The findings of this research challenge some common stereotypes regarding the Haredi sector held in the mainstream society. To begin with, the majority of young and middle aged Haredi women are reasonably well educated, and many of them work outside of home. The mean number of years of formal education in this sample was 14.3 and 26% of these women

have academic degrees, which is comparable to other Jewish women of similar age range. Due to multiple limitations set by Haredi religious ideology and family lifestyle of these women, the vast majority still works within the Haredi sector's education system, but among younger women the increasing numbers secured jobs in computing and information industry, health care and social work.

Significant differences have been found between the two major streams in Haredi sector in Israel – Lithuanian and Hassidic. The former are typically more liberal in their background and lifestyle (which is expressed, specifically, in their more common exposure to secular mass media) and have higher academic achievements, including university or college degrees earned abroad before these women moved to Israel. Over all, about one third of respondents reported their exposure to secular media, and typically these were the better educated and employed women who are in contact with the mainstream Israeli society.

These findings point to the clear negative relationship between Haredi women's levels of education and external employment, on one hand, and the number of children, on the other. Women with the highest education and more demanding employment had significantly fewer offspring to care for than did full-time homemakers with fewer years of education. This refutes the often-cited tenet of Haredi ideologists that there is no link between women's education and fertility in their community. We see that in fact Haredi women do develop rational response to the pressures of their double role (home and work) and solve this problem by having fewer children, exactly like secular women do – in Israel and elsewhere. Thus, Israeli Haredi society seems to slowly adopt a pragmatic approach toward modernity and contemporary technology, denouncing it ideologically but utilizing its gifts and opportunities in everyday life (Ammerman, 1991).

In general, this study supports the assertion that Haredi women are becoming increasingly integrated in broader Israeli society. (Women are probably more integrated than men, due to their work in the mainstream economy.) This integration can be seen as a paradox, as the ultimate goal of Haredi doctrine is to keep women in the domestic sphere and as far as possible from the temptations of modern living. Yet, in fact the men from the “learners community” are often more isolated from mainstream society due to their long-term seclusion in Yeshivas and lack of familiarity with realities of the labor market. Women, who are expected to both raise many children and provide for their families, develop adaptive mechanisms to help them survive this demanding lifestyle. The women increasingly participate in the public sphere and partake in its activities, such as listening to secular radio and watching TV.

Men in the Haredi sector also face the need to adapt to the pressures of the surrounding society, and some of them leave their Torah studies and join the economic marketplace, while many others have adopted some mainstream forms of leisure and entertainment (El-Or and Neria, 2003). It will be interesting to discover in future research whether greater diversity in the lifestyles of Haredi men affects their fertility goals and actual number of children. Some authors (e.g., Berman, 2000) asserted that common Haredi lifestyle based on extended Yeshiva study and reliance on governmental aid in the form of child benefits (increasing with each additional child) is conducive to high and almost uncontrolled fertility. In this way studious ultra-Orthodox men express their commitment

to the community goals of growth and continuity. When and if Haredi men start relying more on their earned income, this may lead to a gradual reduction in fertility rates and more rational models of economic decision-making.

We can therefore point to the ongoing shifts in the nature of gender relations in the Haredi community, whereby a group of educated and economically active women is spearheading changes that can later be adopted by many others. This will probably lead to the gradual modernization of Haredi families (including their smaller size) and narrow lifestyle gaps between the Haredi sector and other Israelis. Since this study is based on a limited sample in a single city (albeit the one with the largest share of Haredi population), we cannot claim establishing causal associations between the variables researched here, but the initial results are nevertheless rather telling. Future research will shed more light on the key trends of differentiation and change in the lives of Israeli Haredi community.

Edited translation from Hebrew by L. Remennick

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Table 1
Number of children by years of formal study
Means, standard deviations, and values of F tests

F (2,243)	15+	14	13-
14.54***	N=103	N=67	N=76
Mean	4.81	6.12	7.21
Std. Deviation	2.8	2.95	3.2

*** P<.001

Figure 1A
Number of children by years of education




Table 2
Women with and without an academic degree listening to secular radio
and number of children (t-test for independent samples)

		Women without academic degree	Women with academic degree
Number of years of formal study		N=170	N=68
t = 9.11*** (df = 236)	Mean	13.45	16.09
	Std. Deviation	1.62	2.14
Number of times listened to secular radio (over the past month)		N=67	N=50
t = 3.34** (df = 115)	Mean	5.43	13.28
	Std. Deviation	10.32	14.03
Number of children		N=145	N=73
t = 3.46** (df = 216)	Mean	6.52	4.99
	Std. Deviation	3.21	2.82

*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 3
Women who work/do not work outside of the home
(t-test for independent samples)

		Women who do not work outside their homes	Women who work outside their homes
Number of years of formal study		N=119	N=141
t = 5.63*** (df = 258)	Mean	13.5	14.87
	Std. Deviation	1.89	2.01
Number of children		N=115	N=129
t = 2.05* (df = 219)	Mean	6.5	5.32
	Std. Deviation	3.13	2.99
Number of times listened to secular radio (over the past month)		N=62	N=68
t = 2.28* (df = 128)	Mean	5.99	10.85
	Std. Deviation	11.06	13.2

*p<.05, *** p<.001

Table 4
Comparison between Lithuanian and Hassidic women
(t-test for independent samples)

		Hassidic	Lithuanian
Number of years of formal study		N=87	N=151
t = 5.73** (df = 236)	Mean	13.32	14.84
	Std. Deviation	2.01	1.93
Number of times listened to secular radio (over the past month)		N=34	N=85
t = 2.06* (df = 117)	Mean	5.38	10.14
	Std. Deviation	10.14	12.96

*p<.05, ** p<.01

Table 5
Comparison between women exposed and non-exposed to secular mass media (t-test for independent samples)

		Not exposed to secular mass media	Exposed to secular mass media
Number of years of formal study		N=182	N=82
t = 5.94*** (df = 262)	Mean	13.74	15.29
	Std. Deviation	1.88	2.11
Number of children		N=163	N=83
t = 2.84** (df = 244)	Mean	6.31	5.12
	Std. Deviation	3.23	2.78

** p<.01, *** p<.001